Intelligence Report : Hezbollah & Tajideen Family

By November 20, 2017 No Comments


Hezbollah Terrorist Organization

Hezbollah is a terrorist organization that seeks to create a fundamentalist Iranian-style Islamic republic around the world and removal of all non-Islamic influences. Hezbollah is one of the most well-funded and dangerous terrorist groups in the world. The U.S. government has recognized this fact.

  • The Annex to Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995 listed Hezbollah as a Specially Designated Terrorist (SDT)
  • The Department of State designated Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997.
  • Additionally, on October 31, 2001, Hezbollah was designated as an SDGT under E.O. 13224
  • On December 16, 2015, Congress passed H.R. 2297, the “Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015”. The bill states that “It shall be U.S. policy to 1.) prevent Hezbollah’s global logistics and financial network from operating in order to curtail funding of its domestic and international activities; and 2.) utilize diplomatic, legislative, and executive avenues to combat Hezbollah’s criminal activities to block that organizations ability to fund its global terrorist activities”.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has also officially recognized Hezbollah as a terrorist organization on March 1, 2015.

Hezbollah’s primary tactic is the use of suicide bombers. Hezbollah is a Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, until September 11, 2001, was responsible for more American deaths than any other terrorist organization.

Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (TF) have operated hand-in-hand for many years. From the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) – an alleged charitable organization – and their ties to Al-Qaeda; to Hezbollah’s use of the drug trade to finance their operations, terrorist groups have employed money laundering techniques to fund their operations for decades.

In a May 2015 testimonial to Congress, David Asher, a board member of the Center on Sanctions and Illicit Finance FDD and Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Society, outlined a recent historical review of Hezbollah’s use of the drug and auto trades. Typically Colombian cartels and Russian organized crime syndicates launder the funds making Hezbollah a thriving trade-based money laundering (TBML) organization. The below excerpt is from Asher’s testimony.

“In 2007, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) launched an undercover investigation called Operation Titan. This operation uncovered Lebanese money laundering for Colombian drug cartels. The DEA revealed a multi-billion dollar per year trade-based scheme for laundering the sale proceeds from tens of tons of Colombian cocaine being trafficked primarily into Europe and Australia. This scheme also involved the purchase of tens of thousands of used cars in the U.S. and Europe for export to car parks in West Africa as well as the acquisition of electronics and textiles in China and Southeast Asia for export to Panama and Curacao.” Asher coined this type of funding for terrorism as “terrorism financing Version 2.0.”

Within this investigation, he discovered that the Lebanese Canadian Bank (LCB) was laundering millions of dollars for known Colombian drug cartel members. In 2011, the U.S. used Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act to cut the LCB off from the U.S. financial system. In December 2011, the Southern District of NY unsealed a historic $483 million dollar civil forfeiture action against LCB.

How the auto lot scam works:
1. An appointed Hezbollah Hawala broker (or Hawaladar), a representative used to receive money from the trusted Islamic Hawala system, inside the U.S. opens checking and savings accounts with a financial institution. The Hawaladar account can be in either his name or a business name. At the new bank, the Hawaladar states that he owns either an auto repair shop or a small used auto lot nearby. KYC or Know Your Customer regulations are mandatory for all registered banks and financial institutions engaged in business within the United States. However, at the time of a new account, the practices of banks and financial companies can be woefully inadequate at fully investigating both individuals and businesses. Often that Hawaladar, disguised as a local small business owner, obtains multiple accounts as several local financial institutions.

2. While the initial accounts are small amounts, several hundred or several thousand dollars, shortly after opening, wire transfers from Benin, totaling from the tens of thousands to millions, are received by the account. The statement will note “for the purchase of cars or vehicle,” and these significant deposits will be made on a daily to weekly basis. Since the owner of these new accounts was an auto dealer, bank personnel supervising these transactions will likely consider the incoming funds are legitimate business deposits.

3. The account owner, acting as a Hawaladar, will then withdrawal partial funds and purchase vehicles at auto lot auctions; typically Manheim auction houses. A balance of funds in the account is quietly used to buy illegal drugs and weapons.

4. The narcotics and guns are then packed into the cars and shipped to designated car parks in Nigeria, Benin, or other destinations in the Middle East.

5. Black market buyers within those countries buy the cars, guns, and drugs. Cash proceeds are then hand delivered by a second Hawaladar to operatives in Hezbollah, typically in Beirut.

A similar scheme that functions, in the same manner, is accomplished by removing the Hawala broker from the equation. Wires are sent directly to both suspecting and unsuspecting legitimate used auto lots. The money is wired directly to them, and a U.S.-based representative is dispatched to pick up the cars and ship them overseas with the drugs and guns packed inside. These schemes, and other like them, have been operating in the U.S. since before 2007. Asher went on to say in his testimony that, “Based on commercial imagery, the designated car parks in Benin have more cars in them than ever before. Based on commercial data records, the ownership of the lots has changed, but by all signs, they remain under the Hezbollah network (same phone, fax, and PO box). According to trade statistics, the number of U.S. used cars exported to Benin has increased dramatically, nearly doubling since 2011.”

Other Documented Hezbollah Schemes
July 2000 Charlotte, North Carolina: Federal authorities indicted 26 individuals associated with a Hezbollah cell in North Carolina that was engaged in fundraising and logistical activities on behalf of Hezbollah (Operation “Smokescreen”). The cell members were smuggling cigarettes from North Carolina in large volumes to Michigan to sell them at a profit by avoiding tax payments. This cell made approximately $8 million before being arrested. The cell used the profits from this illegal smuggling operation to purchase paramilitary type items in the U.S. Members then transported these products to Lebanon for use by Hezbollah military elements. The goods included night vision scopes and goggles, metal detection equipment, global positioning systems, military compasses, binoculars, laser range finders, computer hardware, cameras, high-speed modems, radios, and mining, drilling and blasting equipment.

Multiple media outlets have reported on the use of used car sales and their ability to fund terrorism abroad. These articles were primarily published in 2011 or 2012, approximately the same time the District of NY unsealed the civil forfeiture action against LCB. If one only reads open source media and has never worked within the financial crimes industry, this may lead one to believe that the problem has abated. However, this issue still exists. Multiple large financial institutions have been represented at financial crimes conferences throughout the U.S. and have been recorded as saying that money flowing from West Africa, primarily from Benin, to the used auto lots inside the U.S., is still a massive problem.

Hezbollah members and supporters can reside anywhere in the U.S. However, medium to large size ethnic Lebanese Shia communities are where these agents live. Hezbollah networks can be found in the main American cities such as Detroit, New York, Chicago, Miami, St. Louis, and Los Angeles. Members of Hezbollah networks and cells in the U.S. present themselves as legitimate members of the local community. Members of Hezbollah networks have been shown to commonly operate local businesses such to car sales, clothing, electronics, jewelry, auto repair shops, import/export, and travel agencies. The products, business, and funds that flow through these companies allow Hezbollah associates to transport and move goods across U.S. borders and around the world.

Hezbollah members and supporters residing in the U.S. are often married and have children. Establishing legal status and residency in the U.S. requires Hezbollah associates from Lebanon to marry women that have a legal residency in America. Those brides are either American born with U.S. citizenship status, naturalized U.S. citizens, or legally possess a Green Card. The Green Card is a permanent resident card which grants the holder authorization to live and work in the United States on a permanent basis. For example, in Los Angeles, many Hezbollah supporters married local ethnic Hispanic women who were Green Card holders with legal U.S. status.

Young Hezbollah members and supporters, arriving for the first time in the U.S. will utilize a “student cover” that allows them to obtain a U.S. Student Visa and remain in America. While attending an American university, many of these students will study engineering, medicine, or some other highly technical subject. Upon returning to Lebanon after graduation, they will utilize their newly acquired education and skill to support of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Other graduating students supporting Hezbollah will remain in the U.S. and integrate themselves into American society.

A formal Hezbollah “cell” operating in the U.S. will most often include 3 to 10 Lebanese Shia males between the ages of 20 and 40 years old. A strong, charismatic local leader usually leads these U.S. based Hezbollah cells. The cell members will likely have frequent telephone conversations, emails, and meetings with the other members. These groups maintain “favorite” meeting places such as a selected Shia mosque or an area Islamic cultural center. U.S. based A Hezbollah cell may occasionally have contact with other U.S. based cells arranged through significant Hezbollah members. U.S. based Hezbollah cells have received operational guidance and control from influential Hezbollah networks in America such as those found in the Detroit/Dearborn, Michigan area. On rare occasions, U.S. based Hezbollah cells may receive direct operational guidance from Hezbollah command and control elements in Lebanon.

We strongly believe there are three “types” of individuals in the United States that are supporting Hezbollah operations.

1. Leading the U.S. networks are hardcore, fully trained and vetted Hezbollah members. People at this level have had combat experience in Lebanon, which includes fighting against the Israeli military. These close Hezbollah associates have received extensive training from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp. (IRGC). All of these agents have been thoroughly vetted and are validated members of Hezbollah. These individuals may routinely receive sensitive information on the group’s plans and intentions. Credible intelligence shows that there are very few of this type of Hezbollah members residing in the U.S. These agents travel in and out of the U.S. staying for only short periods of time.

2. We would classify a “regular” Hezbollah member as someone with little or no combat experience in Lebanon and only limited training from Hezbollah. These individuals are supportive of Hezbollah’s political objectives and military goals. Hezbollah networks and cells within the U.S. are believed to be mainly composed of this type of “regular” members. These individuals are likely to support possible lethal Hezbollah operations against American civilians directly.

3. The third category of persons who support Hezbollah is someone who is not recognized as a formal “member” of Hezbollah but is sympathetic to the cause. These supporters of Hezbollah’s political and military agenda do not have combat experience or direct training from Hezbollah. These types of supporters/sympathizers may provide unwitting support to lethal Hezbollah terrorist operations in the U.S. There are many of these types of “support” individuals in the U.S. and who comprise part of “loosely aligned” Hezbollah cells and networks in America.

Aid to Hezbollah arrives in the form of cash and material support. Hezbollah also receives training, weapons, and explosives from Iran along with political, diplomatic, and organizational aid. The bulk of Hezbollah’s outside cash funding is from Iran and Syria. According to Iran’s official budget, the country provided approximately $500 million in support of global radical Islamic organizations during the 1990s. Hezbollah is believed to have received at least $250 million. In 2016, Iran’s contribution to Hezbollah is estimated to be $200 million annually. Syria is thought to provide military assistance, weapons storage, along with embedding and training Hezbollah fighters.

At the same time, this terrorist organization generating tens of millions in revenues from global business networks through both legal and illegal operations. Hezbollah operates as a transnational criminal organization and much smaller transregional criminal networks. Hezbollah associates are deeply involved in criminal enterprises, even acting through outside criminal organizations and cartels using them for Hezbollah’s operational benefit. The U.S. Treasury Department has accused Hezbollah of using money-laundering, the international narcotics trade, and the illegal diamond trade as revenue streams. In recent years, several Lebanese banks acting as Hezbollah fronts have also been sanctioned by the US government. The command and control structure of Hezbollah operations is purposefully opaque and disorganized helping to hide and disguise the many global illicit activities.

Because of Hezbollah’s full range of criminal and terrorist enterprises around the world, the group’s fundraising is a priority for intelligence, law enforcement, and policymakers alike.

In addition to criminal revenue, financing arrives from supporters and Islamic charities. Known charities that directly fund Hezbollah include Al-Aqsa International Foundation, Bonyad-e Shahid (“Martyr’s Organisation”), Al-Mabarrat Charity Association, and other so-called charities.

These family members finance terrorists and maintain businesses that support terrorism around the world. The Tajideen family operates criminal networks and traffic narcotics. These illegal enterprises generate hundreds of millions of dollar in annual revenue that funds terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah. They are a threat to the United States and U.S. civilians.

Kassim Tajideen

Under Arrest: Kassim Tajideen

3/31/2017 UPDATE:
Kassim Arrested and Extradited to U.S. (March 2017)

According to the Washington Post Article “Lebanese businessman, Hezbollah supporter, charged with evading U.S. terror sanctions.”
Kassim Tajideen, 62, a dual ­Lebanese-Belgian citizen, was charged March 7 with conspiracy, fraud and money laundering. He allegedly operated a network of companies from Africa to the Middle East that dealt in secret with U.S. businesses after sending tens of millions of dollars to the Shiite militant group and political party Hezbollah.

Now in a U.S. jail, Kassim Tajideen was arraigned in Federal Court (Washington, D.C) in mid-March on an 11-count criminal indictment. He was arrested while traveling through Monaco where he was held for a brief time then quietly extradited to the United States to face charges. The government is alleging he and his companies violated U.S. terror-related sanctions, money laundering laws. The 27-page federal indictment was unsealed, and a copy of that is available from Tactical Rabbit. He was charged with the following crimes:

18 u.s.c. § 371
50 U.S.C. § 1705(a)
(International Emergency Economic Powers Act)
31 C.F.R. § 594
(Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations)·
18 u.s.c. § 2
(Aiding and Abetting and Causing an Act to Be Done)
18 u.s.c. § 1956(h)
(Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments)
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)
28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)
(Criminal Forfeiture)

With these charges, U.S. prosecutors are alleging that Kassim Tajideen and conspirators used new business names and misrepresented ownership to complete at least 47 fraudulent wire transfers totaling more than $27 million to unwitting U.S. vendors for illegal, unlicensed goods.

The following companies were mentioned in the government indictment:
Epsilon Trading FZE, SOMODEC S.A.R.L., Neptune Enterprise, Congo Stars, General Trade Company, Congo Best Food S.A.R.L., Gitex Co Ltd., Sicam Ltd., and International Cross Trade Company. Several of these businesses are outlined in the most recent Tactical Rabbit Report.

Kassim Tajideen

“….an important financial contributor to Hezbollah” – U.S. Dept of the Treasury

Kassim Tajideen: Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) 5/27/2009. The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated Kassim Tajideen a supporter of the Hezbollah terrorist organization, under E.O. 13224. E.O. 13224 Kassim was found to have been providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. All of his assets under U.S. jurisdiction were frozen, and the designation prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in any transactions with him or his businesses.

Ali Tajideen & Husayn Tajideen

“….were conducting fundraising and other logistical activities in support of Hezbollah through their network of legitimate commercial companies, supermarkets, and real estate dealings.” – U.S. Dept of the Treasury.

Ali Tajideen and Husayn Tajideen: Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) 12/9/2010. The United States Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Husayn Tajideen and Ali Tajideen as Specially Designated Global Terrorists and added them to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List pursuant to E.O.13224. This action also targeted a network of businesses that are owned or controlled by the Tajideen brothers operating in The Gambia, Lebanon, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and the British Virgin Islands.

Ali Tajideen is a former Hezbollah commander and a principal in Jihad Al Bina; the Lebanon-based construction company created and ran by Hezbollah. Jihad Al Bina was designated by the Treasury Department in February 2007 pursuant to E.O. 13224.

Husayn Tajideen is a primary Hezbollah fundraiser and prominent Hezbollah supporter in The Gambia.

The Tajideen brothers utilized the U.S. financial system in support of Hezbollah to launder money and wire transfer money between entities. Many of these transactions, totaling millions of dollars, were routed through legitimate U.S. banks including HSBC Bank. The various wire filter systems and anti-money laundering mechanisms and protocols set up to prevent this type of activity were side-stepped by the Tajideen brothers utilizing technical loopholes. HSBC paid a fine of $32,400 in 2013 after failing to catch transfers between 2010 and 2011 tied to Husayn Tajideen. According to the Justice Department, the movement of these funds violated federal trade sanctions and money laundering statutes.

In 2010, the Treasury designated the following businesses in Ali Tajideen, Husayn Tajideen, and Kassim Tajideen’s network:
Subsidiary: TRADEX CO
Address 1: 62 Buckle Street, Banjul, The Gambia
Address 2: 1 Picton Street, Banjul, The Gambia
Address 3: Dohat Building 1st Floor, Liberation Avenue, Banjul, The Gambia
Address 4: Tajco Building, Hanouay, Sour (Tyre), Lebanon
Address 5: 30 Sani Abacha Street, Freetown, Sierra Leone
Address 6: Tyre, Hannawiyah, Main Street, Tajco Building, Lebanon
Website Address 1:
Website Address 2:

Tajco is a multipurpose, multinational business venture involved in international trade as well as real estate and presided over by Ali, Husayn and Kassim Tajideen. As of February 2007, Kassim Tajideen owned Tajco and used proceeds from this business to provide millions of dollars in financial support to Hezbollah. Husayn Tajideen, co-owner of Tajco Ltd in The Gambia, serves as the company’s managing director. Ali Tajideen and Kassim Tajideen were business partners and co-owners of Tajco Sarl, operating as Tajco Company LLC in Tyre, Lebanon, with Ali Tajideen serving as the managing partner. Since at least December 2007, Ali Tajideen used Tajco Sarl, operating as Tajco Company LLC, as the primary entity to purchase and develop properties in Lebanon on behalf of Hezbollah. Under the name of Tajco Company LLC, Ali Tajideen developed the properties, established mortgage loans and acquired mortgage life insurance to cover the mortgage borrowers.

Kairaba Supermarket
Address 1: Kairaba Ave, P.O. Box 2176, Banjul, The Gambia
Address 2: 62 Buckle Street, Banjul, The Gambia
Address 3: Pipeline Road, Banjul, The Gambia
Kairaba Supermarket is a subsidiary business of Tajco Ltd, with both companies naming Husayn Tajideen as the same point of contact and manager using the same primary business address.

Congo Futur Group
Address 1: Future Tower, 3462 Boulevard du 30 Juin, Gombe, Kinshasa, Democratic
Republic of the Congo
Address 2: Avenue du Flambeau 389, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Website Address:
As of mid-2007, Kassim Tajideen owned Congo Futur. The Tajideen brothers were running cover companies in the food and diamond trades for Hezbollah. Kassim Tajideen owns Ovlas Trading which operates in the food manufacturing business.

Golfrate Holdings (Angola) Lda
Address 1: Avenida 4 de Fevereiro No. 13, C.P. 6172, Luanda, Angola
Address 2: Avenida 4 de Fevereiro 13 R/N, Luanda, Angola
Address 3: Av. 4 de Fevereiro no 13 R/C, Luanda, Angola
Email Address 1: [email protected]
Email Address 2: [email protected]
Email Address 3: [email protected]
Website Address:
Owned by Kassim Tajideen, Golfrate is a wholly owned subsidiary of Ovlas Trading, with part of its principal operations located in Angola.

Afri Belg Commercio E Industria Lda
Address 1: Rua Comandante Valodia 266-268, Sao Paulo, Luanda, Angola
Address 2: Avenida Comandante De Valodia n. 0.67, 1 Andar, Luanda, Angola
Email Address: [email protected]
Telephone: +244-222430941, 442092
Fax: +244-222442092
Website Address:
Founded: February 21, 1995
Employees: 200 (2016)
Mr. Kassim Tajideen Chairman
Mr. Hassan Tajideen Vice Chairman
Mr. Mohammed Tajideen CEO
Mr. Zeya Uddin Director
Arosfram Holding Co. holds 100.00% of outstanding shares.

Grupo Arosfran Empreendimentos E Participacoes Sarl (Grupo Arosfran)
Subsidiary: AROSFRAN
Address 1: 1st Floor, Avenida Comandante Valodia, No. 65, Luanda, Angola
Address 2: Rua Clube Maritimo Africano, No 22 r/c, Luanda, Angola
Address 3: Rua Comandante de Volodia, No 67, Premiero Andar, Luanda, Angola
Address 4: Avenida Comandante de Valodia, No. 0.67, 1 Andar, Luanda, Angola
Address 5: Rua General Rocadas 5, Luanda, Angola
Email Address 1: [email protected]
Email Address 2: [email protected]
Email Address 3: [email protected]
Website Address:
Kassim Tajideen founded Grupo Arosfran in Luanda, Angola, in November 1991. He has been the primary decision maker and leader of Grupo Arosfran and a member of the Board of Directors. Grupo Arosfran is listed as either a branch or a subsidiary of Ovlas Trading on multiple international business websites.

A previous Tajideen financial agent in Switzerland directly linked to the family businesses through their offshore corporations.

Sebastien Thierry
This financial agent in Switzerland has acted as an intermediary, agent, shareholder, and officer for some of the Tajideen family’s offshore corporations over more than a decade and may still be working with them in 2017 from his offices in Switzerland.

Sebastien Thierry

Sebastien Thierry

Here are some versions of his name and name word combinations that have been used to registered offshore corporations.
Sebastien Thierry
Sebastien Thierry Rouge
Mr. Sébastien Clamorgan-Thierry
Sebastien Clamorgan-Thierry
DOB: March 1967
Nationality: French
Residence: Switzerland
Address: Baden Switzerland 5401
Linked Addresses:
36 Boulevard Helvetique; 1207 Geneva; Switzerland
Boulevard Helique 36: 1207 Geneve; Switzerland

Individual: Ali TAJIDEEN
AKA: TAJEDDIN, Ali Mohammad Abed Al-Hassan
AKA: TAJEDDIN, Ali Mohammad Abdel Hassan
DOB 1: 1961
DOB 2: 1963
POB: Hanaway (Hanouay/Hanawiya), Lebanon
Nationality: Lebanese

Individual: Kassim TAJIDEEN
AKA: Kassim Mohammad Tajiddine
AKA: Qasim Taji Al-Din
AKA: Kasim Taji Al-Din
AKA: Kasim Tajmudin
DOB: March 21, 1955
POB: Sierra Leone
Passport 1: 0285669 (Sierra Leone)
Passport 2: RL1794375 (Lebanon)
Nationality 1: Leonean
Nationality 2: Lebanese

Individual: Husayn TAJIDEEN
AKA: TAJIDINE, Hajj Hussein
Address: The Gambia
DOB: 1963

$1.2 Million Seized (2016 case 1:16-cv-00064-RВW)
This was a civil forfeiture action with United States currency traceable to violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, and involved in violations of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956. These funds are subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A), (C), and 984.
Kassim Tajideen filed a claim in the administrative forfeiture proceedings asserting an interest in the funds seized by virtue of his ownership of International Cross Trade Company Limited (“ICTC”), the company that wired the seized funds into a Wells Fargo account.

Immediately after the 2010 designation of TAJCO as a SDGT, Husayn Tajideen changed the name of the company in Gambia from Tajco Company Limited to Grand Stores Limited. On April 19, 2012, OFAC amended its SDGT designation of TAJCO to include Grand Stores as an alias of TAJCO in Gambia. After the designation of Grand Stores as an SDGT, Husayn Tajideen reorganized the company in Gambia and shifted business from Grand Stores to entities Sub Zero Food Company (“Sub Zero”), Shanser General Merchandise (“Shanser”), and OSS Food Stuff Import & Export Limited (“OSS”). TAJCO, Grand Stores, Shanser, Sub Zero, and OSS were owned by and for the benefit of Tajideen and others. ICTC, the company that had wired the seized funds, was a holding company incorporated in the United Arab Emirates and operated by Tajideen and others working on his behalf in Lebanon. ICTC maintained bank accounts in the United Arab Emirates in financial institutions known as Emirates NBD Bank PJSC, Sharjah Islamic Bank, and Mashreq Bank. ICTC was owned by and for the ultimate benefit of Tajideen and others.

In court papers, the Justice Department’s efforts to win the forfeiture of these funds were supported by the sworn statement of a Drug Enforcement Administration task force agent, suggesting that the forfeiture case is connected to a federal investigation into suspected drug trafficking.

FARC lawsuit & Foreign Judgement
(Case 1:15-cv-08652-LTS Filed 09/18/15)
More recently, Kassim Tajideen’s Hezbollah connections drew him into the middle of federal lawsuits filed by former FARC kidnapping victims. A federal court in 2010 awarded $318 million in damages to the family of Thomas Janis, an American pilot, and to Keith Stansell, Marc Gonsalves and Thomas Howes. FARC forces captured the men — who were civilian contractors flying surveillance over FARC territory — when their plane crashed in 2003. Janis and another crew member were immediately executed, while Howes, Stansell and Gonsalves were held captive until their rescue in 2008. When collecting damages from the FARC — which has few U.S. assets to seize if any — proved difficult, lawyers for the men went after funds held by alleged FARC associates, moving to seize assets held by the Tajideen brothers and their companies. Since Hezbollah had profited from distributing FARC cocaine and laundering the proceeds, the lawyers argued, FARC victims could collect Hezbollah-linked funds.

Husayn Tajideen

Husayn Tajideen

Kassim Arrested in Belgium
In May 2003, Belgium police arrested Kassim Tajideen and his wife in a raid on Soafrimex, one of Kassim’s Hezbollah businesses in Antwerp. Following a four-month international investigation led by Belgium’s Economic Crimes Unit, the country’s judicial police raided the Antwerp offices of Kassim Tajideen’s company Soafrimex, which specialized in exporting food to African countries. Kassim and his wife along with Huda Saad and several company officials were arrested for fraud, money laundering, and diamond smuggling. He and his wife were accused by the Belgium authorities of “large-scale tax fraud, money laundering, and trade in diamonds of doubtful origin, to the value of tens of millions of Euros.” A six-year legal process in Belgium closed with the government dropped charges of financing terrorism and illegal diamond dealing. A Belgian court instead fined Tajideen and his wife 150,000 euros each for “illegal capital gains, created by a system of under invoicing …entirely accounted to the African customers” and unrelated to Hezbollah or “any other alleged terrorist organization.”

Husayn Tajideen
Husayn Tajideen is a primary Hezbollah fundraiser in The Gambia. Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) 12/9/2010.

Ali Tajideen
Ali Tajideen is a former Hezbollah commander in Hanouay, Lebanon and has provided cash to Hezbollah, in tranches as large as $1 million. He is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) 12/9/2010. Ali Tajideen is a major player in “Jihad Al Bina,” a Lebanon-based construction company formed and operated by Hezbollah, which was designated by the Treasury Department in February 2007.

Ali Tajideen

Ali Tajideen

Ali Tajideen has been buying land throughout southern Lebanon and allowing Hezbollah to use it, as well as, developing the land. According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, since at least December 2007, Ali Tajideen used Tajco Sarl, operating as Tajco Company LLC, as the primary entity to purchase and develop properties in Lebanon on behalf of Hezbollah. While Ali Tajideen claims that these property purchases are just part of his real estate portfolio, local villagers in southern Lebanon have reported that he often pays several times more than the asking price – and, these lands are located in strategic areas for Hezbollah lands located north of the Litani river. Ali Tajideen and Kassim Tajideen were business partners and co-owners of Tajco Sarl, operating as Tajco Company LLC in Tyre, Lebanon, with Ali Tajideen serving as the managing partner.

Ahmed Tajideen

Ahmed Tajideen

Ahmed Tajideen
Ahmed Tijideen was managing director of Sicam Ltd.
Sicam Ltd was an importation and distribution company located in Luanda, Angola, that was formerly known as FozKudia Industrial LDA (“FozKudia”). During December 1, 2013, through June 1, 2015, at least six sales transactions and other financial events occurred between ICTC, Sicam Ltd, and Kassim Tajideen, all affecting interstate, and foreign commerce. These were the basis of the government’s $1.2 million money laundering seizure. (2016 case 1:16-cv-00064-RВW)
Ahmed operated Congo Futur group in the DRC. (Congo Futur is subsidiary of Antwerp-based Soafrimex) Soafrimex is one of Kassim’s Hezbollah businesses in Antwerp raided in 2003.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo
Congo’s environmental ministry awarded long-term contracts for thousands of hectares of rainforest to the Trans-M company. Ahmed Tajideen is the owner of Trans-M and was granted continued lucrative forestry contracts in the DRC. Four months after Congo Futur’s 2010 sanctions listing, Trans-M changed its name to Cotrefor and Ahmed Tajideen was removed from its list of shareholders. In a 2013 report published by the Congolese Ministry of Trade, Cotrefor is listed as a subsidiary of the Congo Futur group. Cotrefor has also occupied Congo Futur’s offices in Kinshasa; an address listed on the US sanctions list. (According to and Unsanctioned Trade) Ahmed Tajideen was not a target of the 2010 Treasury sanctions.

Associated Address:
Links Ahmed Tajideen & Vagram Simonyan (South Airlines Co. Democratic Republic of the Congo)

Hassan Tajideen
AKA: Hassan Ali Tajideen
AKA: Ahmad Hassan Tajedinne
AKA: Hassan Tajiddin
AKA: Dr. Hassan Tajideen
Not to be confused with Hassan Tajideen, a Hezbollah financier who died in the Ethiopian Airlines airplane crash in 2010. Born on February 8, 1985, Hassan Tajideen is considerably younger than Ali or Kassim.

Tajco Organizational Chart

Tajco Organizational Chart

Partner & CEO at Tajco Holding (Lebanon) He lists himself as the CEO of Tajco Holdings a Lebanese holding company with interests in real estate development and investment, supermarkets, and other industries. The U.S. Department of Treasury has implicated “Tajco” in money laundering for Hezbollah. However, neither Hassan Tajideen nor Tajco Holding (Lebanon) was designated by the OFAC in 2010.

Tajideen helped co-found DollySoft, an accounting and management software provider. He is the Executive Director.

Hassan Tajideen is very active on several social media platforms, including Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, Quora, his personal website and others.

Phone: 009613099393
[email protected]
[email protected] Blog/  tajideenhassan people/[email protected]/?rb=1 tajideenhassan

Many of his postings, which focus on his business activities, are in Arabic. Hassan Tajideen appears not only to be the CEO of Tajco, but also the public face of the Tajideen family.

The following businesses in the Tajideen brothers’ network were designated as part of OFAC’s 2010 actions: Tajco, Ovlas Trading S.A., Golfrate Holdings (Angola) Lda, a wholly owned subsidiary of Ovlas Trading; another subsidiary of Ovlas Trading; Grupo Arosfran Empreendimentos E Participacoes Sarl (Grupo Arosfran): Grupo Arosfran yet another branch or a subsidiary of Ovlas Trading.

Ovlas Trading Chart

Ovlas Trading Chart

Ovlas Trading S.A. (Inactive)
AKA: Ovlas Trading S.A.L.
Address 1: Al Salia Building, Embassy Street, Bir Hassan, Beirut, Lebanon
Address 2: Akara Building,
24 De Castro Street, Wickhams Cay 1, Road Town,
Tortola, Virgin Islands, British
Hassan is listed as a shareholder of Ovlas Trading S.A. a
registered corporation in the British Virgin Islands. This company became inactive in September of 2011.

HASSAN TAJIDDIN Shareholder 12-OCT-2008 15-FEB-2011
NADINE TAJIDDIN Shareholder 18-SEP-2004
NEJMEE JABER-TAJIDEN Shareholder 18-SEP-2004
THE BEARER Shareholder 09-MAY-2003 18-SEP-2004
THE BEARER Shareholder 09-MAR-2003 12-OCT-2008
Nejme Jaber-Tajideen is listed as Beneficiary
Incorporated: 09-MAY-2003
Inactivation: 08-SEP-2011
Struck off: 31-OCT-2011
Registered: British Virgin Islands

Ovlas Trading S.A. (Inactive)
There was also an Ovlas Trading S.A. Registered in Niue previously linked to business between African countries and Lebanon.
Incorporated: 6 October 2003
Inactive: 10 March 2005
Struck off: 6 June 2006
Registered in Niue
MR. SAYYU DANTATA Shareholder 06-OCT-2003
MR. ALIKO DANGOTE Shareholder 06-OCT-2003
MRS OIL & GAS CO. LTD. Shareholder 06-OCT-2003

OVLAS Trading S.A. (Active)
Active in 2017 and owned by Ovlas Management S.A.M., Monaco, with directors Imad Hassoun and Hassan Tajideen.
Head trustee office in Francis Rachel Road,Victoria Seychelles;
Telephone: 248-323850; Fax: 248-225432;
PO. Box 1137, Victoria;
A corporation founded in 17/03/2004
In 2017 officer director list:
Director: Imad Hassoun
Director: Mr. Hassan Tajideen
Shareholders as of 2017:
Ovlas Management SAM, Monaco owns 100.00% of the company shares

OVLAS Management S.A.M. (Active) (Date of record: 07-04-2016)
Address: 27 Boulevard Albert 1er, Monaco 98000, Monaco;
Telephone: 97976940; Fax: 97770783; DUNS: 38-367-6137; Class code: 7379-1972 SIC code;v Legal status: Corporation; Employees: 1,314;
Description: Computer related services, NEC, NSK;
Ovlas Management S.A.M., Monaco, owns Ovlas Trading S.A.

Ovlas Commodities S.A. (Inactive)
Registered in: Panama
Incorporated: 24-SEP-2007
Inactivation: 24-JAN-2013
Struck off: 15-JAN-2013
Linked countries: Lebanon
Karbelina Investments LLC is a shareholder of Ovlas Commodities S.A.
Ovlas Trading S.A. is a shareholder of Ovlas Commodities S.A.

Karbelina Investments LLC (Inactive)
U.S. Corporation, Wyoming
Registered Address: 1605 Pebrican Avenue; Cheyenne, WY 82001
4-12-2009 Administratively Dissolved (Tax)

Ovlas Refining S.A. (Inactive)
Registered in: Seychelles
Incorporated: 20-FEB-2007
Inactivation: 03-JAN-2013
Struck off: 31-DEC-2012
Linked countries: Lebanon

(Intermediary of Ovlas Trading S.A. BVI)
(Intermediary of G.A. Line (Go Angola) Limited

Ovlas Trading Chart 3

Ovlas Trading Chart

G.A. Line (Go Angola) Limited (Inactive)
Registered in: British Virgin Islands
Registered address: OVLAS TRADING Al Saliyah Building Ground Floor; Safarat Street Bir Hassan Beirut; 77494
Incorporated: 11-MAR-2008
Inactivation: 07-SEP-2011
Struck off: 31-OCT-2011
Linked countries: United States

Sid Holdings Corp. (Active)
Registered in: Panama
Incorporation Date June 17, 2011

Sayyu Dantata

Sayyu Dantata

Mr. Sayyu DANTATA [Billionare Nigeria] Shareholder 17-JUN-2011
Linked countries: Nigeria
Intermediary AFREX SAL
2; Polo House; Tincan Island Port Road; Apapa; Lagos; Nigeria
Mr. Sayyu Dantata is a Nigerian billionaire and was also a shareholder in OVLAS TRADING S.A. Registered in: Niue circa 2003.
Sid Holdings Corp. is a shareholder in GSCO Ltd.

Sayyu Dantata
Alhaji Sayyu Dantata is the chairman of MRS Group Companies. He is the founder and Chief Executive Director of MRS Holdings Limited. Mr. Alhaji has been in the petroleum industry for more than 17 years. He founded the MRS Group in 1995. MRS Group Companies include the likes of Corlay Global SA, Ovlas Trading SA, and Ovlas Services Geneva. His career began as the Chief Executive of Dangote Transport, Dangote Group. He is a former Director of Transnational Corporation of Nigeria Plc.

GSCO Ltd. (Active)
Registered in: Seychelles
Incorporation Date June 15, 2011
Linked countries: Lebanon

Sid Holdings Corp. is a shareholder in Petrowest Operations Services S.A.

Petrowest Operations Services S.A.

Petrowest Operations Services S.A.

Petrowest S.A. (Inactive)
Registered in: Seychelles
Incorporation Date June 17, 2011
Inactivation Date April 15, 2013
Struck Off Date July 15, 2014
Linked countries: Lebanon

Shareholders in Petrowest S.A. included the following familiar names. (see chart)
Mr. Sayyu Dantata
MRS Oil & Gas Co. Ltd
Mr. Aliko Dangote

Ovlas Futures and Derivatives Inc. is a shareholder of Petrowest S.A.
Ovlas Trading S.A. Is a shareholder of Ovlas Futures and Derivatives Inc.

Ovlas Futures and Derivatives Inc.
Registered in: Panama
Incorporated: 23 March 2007
Inactive: 15 April 2013
Struck off: 15 July 2014
Linked countries: Lebanon

G.F.B.I Limited (Active)
Registered in: British Virgin Islands
Incorporation Date January 27, 2000
Shareholder: Bearer (Officer)
Shareholder: Brotherhood Foundation (Officer)
Beneficiary: Ali Ghandour (Officer)
Intermediary: The Levant Lawyers
–3rd Party of Interest– Associated with this company
Ali Rafic M. Ghandour – Carter Properties Inc. (Saudi Arabia)
Ghandour Ali Fouad – Bbb Investments Group S.A. (Lebanon)
Ali Ghandour –
G.F.F. Limited (Lebanon)
G.F.G Limited (Lebanon)
G.F.B.I. Limited (Lebanon)

Impex International Ltd. (Inactive) (AHMED TAJIDEEN is a Shareholder)
Incorporated: 11-JUN-2003
Inactivation: 30-SEP-2011
Struck off: 31-DEC-2012
Registered in: Seychelles
Linked countries: United Arab Emirates

South Airlines Co.

South Airlines Co.

South Airlines Co.
Status: Active
Registered in: Seychelles
Linked countries: United Arab Emirates
The Tajideen brothers have also been linked to South Airlines Co. an active company registered in Seychelles (Incorporated: 02-APR-2003) and connected to business in the United Arab Emirates.